

This report seeks to highlight some of the most interesting discussions during the latest meeting. It has been prepared by the representatives of the Southern Region of CND, Peter Gloyns, Salisbury CND, and Nigel Day, Oxford CND.

Kate Hudson, General Secretary of National CND, summed up the current situation that we are in. She started by saying there is much talk of World War III and reality is escalating that way. The recent NATO Summit in Washington informed us that the US is putting long range missiles in Germany. There is also talk of France, Italy and Germany wishing to develop a European long range missile. The summit highlighted the risks from the Middle East, Iran and China and worried about the growing relationship between Russia and China.

There is growing attention to military use of cyberspace and space itself. Two third of NATO members now spend at least 2% of GDP on their military. They are investing in nuclear, chemical and biological defence and enhancing air and missile defence. One notable development is the Aegis site in Poland. The **United States missile defence complex in Poland**, replaced a planned site in [Redzikowo, Poland](#) with a phased plan—the [Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System](#), including SM-3 Block IIA interceptors to be positioned in Poland from 2018; Naval Support Facility-Redzikowo is to transition from [Missile Defense Agency](#) control to the [US Navy](#) on Friday, 15 December 2023, according to the [Prime Minister of Poland, Donald Tusk](#), and [Sixth Fleet](#). The official transfer to [NATO](#) is scheduled for mid-2024.

In general there is an increase in operational nuclear warheads and a strengthening of the defence industries.

More support has been promised for Ukraine, with 40 billion Euros earmarked for next year. There is NATO condemnation of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus and Russia's absence from the treaties designed to limit deployment of such weapons. There is no mention that the US pulled out of these treaties too. Much emphasis on Chinese responsibility for military developments in cyberspace and space, without mention of the US commitment to dominate space.

NATO seeks to boost the co-operation between itself and Australia, Japan and South Korea via the AUKUS agreement and other initiatives.

Keir Starmer had his first meeting on the world stage and was very on side with NATO. He stressed that Britain was back on the world stage and wanted to re-set our military co-operation with Europe. Our increase in nuclear warheads was described as “fixed”

The Lakenheath protest was mentioned on Newsnight and the BBC website carries coverage <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cg3jgzdgqyjo>

The Strategic Defence Review in the UK was announced and this will provide a chance for CND to contribute.

The continued attacks in Gaza were noted and Kate expressed pride in the way CND groups had worked to raise awareness of this situation. Efforts to reach a ceasefire seem to meet with constant delays.

The US election is scheduled for November 5th and Trump looks to be the favourite, despite the numerous legal cases that he faces.

France and Germany favour the development of European nuclear weapons. A webinar is planned for next Thursday focussing on this issue. <https://www.cndsalisbury.org.uk/events/921-eurobomb-no-thanks-preventing-nuclear-proliferation-in-europe-nil-cnd-webinar-2>

The UN prep com takes place next week and will be live streamed via the UN's website. <http://webtv.un.org/en>, <https://cnduk.org/events/eurobomb-no-thanks-preventing-nuclear-proliferation-in-europe-cnd-side-event-at-npt-prepcom/>

The US and the UK have declared space as a war fighting domain and this is an area of major military escalation. China is seen as a major enabler of Russian action in Ukraine.

Ian Fairlie talked of his work that has identified cardiovascular risks associated with exposure to radiation, as an additional risk to the more widely known cancer risks. <https://cnduk.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/New-radiation-risks.pdf>

CND recommends that the revised absolute risks of fatal cancer (13% per Sv) plus CVD (3.66% per Sv) should be added together and a new single fatal risk of at least 17% per Sv should be published.

As this considerably increases our perception of radiogenic risks, consideration should also be given to tightening the annual public limit for radiation exposures from all sources at least threefold from 1 mSv/a to 0.3 mSv/a for adult males. For adult women the limit should be tightened further to 0.1 mSv/a and for all children tightened to 0.03 mSv/a to recognise their increased sensitivities to radiation.

Ian Fairlie has a new book out on this topic available from Ethics Press <https://ethicspress.com/products/the-scientists-who-alerted-us-to-the-dangers-of-radiation>
It will be in paperback in November.

World BEYOND War has given the 2024 Lifetime Organizational War Abolisher Award to No to War – No to NATO*, an international network that has led the way in educating on alternatives to NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and in organising protests, demonstrations, and creative actions opposing NATO militarism since 2009. The network includes 650 organisations in over 30 countries, and has organised protests and counter-summits at NATO meetings year after year. No to War

– No to NATO has been a big part of the planning of a counter-summit and rally held on July 6-7, 2024, in Washington, DC

Accepting the award at an online public award ceremony on July 22, 2024, will be five people, one of whom will be Kate Hudson

Jeremy Corbin is now the chairman of Parliamentary CND. The Mutual defence Agreement is coming up for review in the autumn, and this, together with Lakenheath, will both be priorities for Parliamentary CND

Oxford CND contributed the following.

Keep Space for Peace Week

Keep Space For Peace week is taking place this year between 5-12 October and now is the time to start planning our activities for this important week. Keep Space For Peace week coincides with the United Nations World Space Week, which aims to “celebrate the contributions of space science and technology to the betterment of the human condition”. Despite the UN’s aspiration to use space to advance scientific and humanitarian goals, space technology already plays a key role in supporting military operations and the world’s militaries are pushing hard to make space a battleground of the future.

Plans are already in hand to arrange Keep Space For Peace demonstrations at a number of UK military bases involved in space operations, and this year we are hoping to see a new high in the number demonstrations and campaign activities over the week. Drone Wars UK has recently launched Space Watch UK: a new project which aims to investigate and challenge the militarisation and corporate exploitation of space and the UK’s military space programme. We are very keen to work with and support local peace groups in campaigning on space issues, both during Keep Space For Peace week and over the rest of the year.

You don’t have to be part of a local community based close to a space operations site to take part in the campaign – and you might find that there is a company working on military space technology closer to home than you thought! Why not invite one of our expert speakers to a meeting of your local peace group to find out more? If you would like to get involved and discuss how your group can get involved in stopping the militarisation of space, please get in touch: info@spacewatch.org

More details: <https://spacewatch.uk> <https://space4peace.org/keep-space-for-peace-week/>
<https://space4peace.org/keep-space-for-peace-week>

They also reported on the ongoing work of Nukewatch, which provides vital insights into the movements of nuclear materials around the UK. These are described as the most dangerous cargos on our roads.

Kate Hudson introduced a document in the Campaigns Plenary section of the meeting, aimed at framing the priorities for CND in the coming year.

1. Campaigns plenary discussion document with motion

The 2024 general election and the work of CND

I write this on 5th July as we hear the outcome of the general election.

My first response is enormous relief and happiness that our Vice-President Jeremy Corbyn has been re-elected, as an Independent MP – so will have his powerful and principled voice for peace in Parliament, unconstrained by attempts of party whips or leaderships to silence him. It has also been great to see the election of four other independent candidates on the platform of ceasefire in Gaza, responding to the No Ceasefire, No Vote slogan of our solidarity movement. Together with MPs from other parties that oppose the genocide and support a free and sovereign Palestinian state, this will be a strong base in parliament.

Clearly there is much analysis to be done: it appears that Labour has a landslide of seats based on the same electoral support as it received in 2019. The right-wing vote has been split between Tory and Reform but may regroup and will attempt a comeback at the next election. These are big challenges, moving forward. The SNP has been much reduced: what will this mean for anti-nuclear policy and sentiment in Scotland, and the work of SCND? The Green Party now has 4 seats; they are good on many of our issues but have recently changed their policy on NATO, not in a good way. The LibDems now have a much larger cohort of MPs and they have some progressive policies and a strong anti-Trident group of activists with which we can re-engage. Wales is now a Tory-free zone: are there new possibilities for the peace agenda for CND Cymru?

The Labour government's policies are explicitly pro-nuclear weapons, pro-increased arms spending, pro-war in Ukraine and Gaza, pro-NATO, and tied into the pro-US ideological and military framework. Much is the same as the previous government's policies, but this is a new situation, and we need to assess our strategic approach to the new government. Labour is expected to undertake a review of Defence policy in its first year. We need to be part of this where possible, and raising the key issues outside the Labour Party where direct engagement is not possible. We will be raising crucial issues: not only the urgent issues of the moment – Gaza and Ukraine – but broader underlying policies: nuclear weapons possession; NATO policies following the forthcoming Washington 75th anniversary summit; Lakenheath; AUKUS and military alliances; the cold war on China; the British economy and the so-called 'defence' industry and its relations with sections of the trade union movement.

As a set of initial proposals to strengthen our work in this new period, I suggest the following steps, designed to increase our readiness and effectiveness to intervene politically:

Council agrees:

1. The reconstituting of Parliamentary CND on the basis of the new intake and existing anti-nuclear and pro-peace MPs; for increased parliamentary intervention in the new context.
2. The strengthening of our trade union work, through the Trade Union Advisory Group and the engagement of individual members as well as trade union affiliates, and supportive trade-union engaged MPs.
3. The strengthening and re-generation of specialist sections, in political parties and faith and other communities.
4. The support for our nations where new political challenges and opportunities have arisen, owing to the election outcomes, and continued support for our regions and groups in engaging with the new challenges.
5. The consolidation and expansion of our civil society alliances, with anti-nuclear, anti-war and pro-peace and justice organisations, and the reflection of this in our autumn annual conference; our continuing work with the Palestine coalition.
6. The strengthening of our international links and solidarity, to ensure that we are an active part of the global majority for peace.

Kate Hudson – General Secretary

A second discussion considered the following topic.

2. RETHINKING GEOPOLITICS: BEYOND NATO - an initial discussion

‘We are in the midst of a strategic competition to shape the future of the international order’. US National Security Strategy (NSS), 2022.

Introduction: These notes aim to take stock of the fast changing international security order, thinking beyond the Atlanticist frame of NATO. The fact is that, for the US, intent on maintaining its hegemonic world position, the traditional alliance architecture is ill-fitted to meet the challenges of the rise of China and the

technological (4th industrial) revolution. What is happening to the international security order? What relevance these changes have to CND campaigning. (1)

PART 1: Atlanticist-centred security facing new challenges

Geopolitics: In 2022, China was identified in the US National Defence Strategy as America's 'most consequential geopolitical challenge' - the 'pacing challenge' - one greater even than Russia's invasion of Ukraine which poses 'an immediate and ongoing threat to..Europe'. The next 10 years - to 2032 - was identified as 'the decisive decade'.

The post-war security architecture rests on NATO and the 'hub and spokes' US bilateral military alliances in Asia. Over the decades, this Cold War structure has been modified by a series of arms control agreements.

China's rise now challenges these structures, not least since it is seen to lie outside the arms control agreements. Alarms were raised when it shot down a satellite in 2007, and the fact that the INF did not cover China's land-based missiles was a key factor in the deliberate sabotage of the treaty in 2018. (2)

Challenging the rules-based international order: warfare is being transformed by technological innovation, developments which, like the Wild West, are lawless.

US neocon think tanks have long labelled Russia and China as revisionist powers, then in 2018 Trump officially declared the two states challengers to the '*rules based international order*' as they attempt to '*erode the prosperity and security of the US*'. NATO's 2022 summit was more explicit, stating that China '*strives to subvert the rules-based international order, including in the space, cyber and maritime domains*'.

Following this, the US 2022 NSS claimed that China '*harbors the intention and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the international order in favor of one that tilts the global playing field to its benefit*' and highlights the '*acute need*' for '*rules of the road for technology, cyberspace, trade, and economics*'.

Key technologies and their role in war fighting China now has the lead in 37 out of 44 critical technologies.(3) The US has narrowed its focus down to 4/5 technologies, key to the future of war-fighting: artificial intelligence, quantum science, autonomy, biotechnology, and space technologies. (4) Military industrial corporations steer their development. There are important linkages, for example, AI is vital in the space domain - in processing information gathered from monitoring bases of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to ensure critical advantages in precision-strike technology for US-led military operations.

The challenge to the global military security architecture NATO's formal Article 5 collective security structure is altogether too restrictive and cumbersome: an Asian NATO was never possible after WW2 given war legacy barriers between South Korea and Japan, Australia and Japan etc. Today there are growing tensions within NATO - France's opposition to a NATO office in Japan, differences over the use of weapons supplied to Ukraine. NATO and the Pacific 'hub and spokes' alliance structure are simply not sufficient to contain China and to win the 5-tech race. Ideas of a Global NATO or Asian NATO still start from the Atlantic centre, leading to the wrong questions.

PART 2 New developments in the international security order

A flexible global military architecture is in the making with the US, drawing Japan, India and Australia into the QUAD; Japan, South Korea and the Philippines into the informally named US-led; Australia and the UK into AUKUS - all these aimed against China; as well as reviving the '5 eyes' intelligence group and expanding the group of 40 countries which support Ukraine. These 'like minded' countries are flexibly grouped around various levels of sharing military intelligence, military exercises and military cooperation including missile defence and weapons manufacture.

AUKUS demonstrates this beyond-NATO approach with its pillar 2 covering AI, cyber-, quantum computing, undersea capabilities, hypersonic and deep space. The 'Squad' is growing out of a series of reciprocal access agreements (RAAs) promoting joint military actions in the seas around China. Britain has an RAA with Japan and is negotiating with the Philippines and South Korea. The recent US-Philippines Balakatan military exercise which saw the US deploy land-based ballistic missiles on Philippines territory involved Japan and South Korea as observers plus Germany, France, the UK, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and others.

New ways of financing This new architecture has also opened wider ways of financing. The new technologies are enormously expensive: Europe, the UK, Japan, South Korea, Australia etc all must contribute more. The private sector is also being included in new ways (Musk and Starlink in the Ukraine). Private companies can cooperate more flexibly than states eg. British Aerospace, Mitsubishi and Leonardo joint production of next generation 6G fighter jets. However MOD or US DOD financing can be slow and clunky: to win the innovation race with China, finance has to get to the spot fast. Now venture capital is financing new tech start-ups.

New 'rules of the road' - international relations are edging into a new era of rule making. How are the new technologies to be regulated - for profit or for human good? Who will control them - states, corporations? Will there be competing Cold War-type blocs with different rules? There is great potential also for human good, for example, AI's increased capabilities of information gathering and processing can make an immense contribution in tackling climate change. Can common security interests then shape agendas? Negotiations on AI are intense - China's attendance at

the Bletchley Park conference last year was a start. Former Australian Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, a voice from the liberal international order, argues that differences with China for example around cyberspace and space are all negotiable.

Other factors at play: new technologies are highly energy intensive; they are also generating new tensions with fierce competition over chips, resources and minerals. At the same time catastrophic effects of climate change make new demands on international cooperation. With the global balance of power at an inflexion point, smaller developing states are seeking a greater say. (TPNW, Gaza genocide).

To conclude

The US's claimed acute need to contain China's technological advance is generating a new type of global military security architecture where existing structures are insufficiently flexible. A lattice of vari-levelled networks is growing through operational, commercial and financial linkages as well as military agreements. As formal arms controls have broken down, new rules and ways of rule-making are emerging.

The peace movement seeks to shape a new security architecture based not on monopoly and containment but on a people-to-people based common security. To do so we need to think beyond NATO. This changing context is also relevant to campaigning against rising military spending and increasing military industrial job creation.

Jenny Clegg
CND IAG

1. The notes were originally drafted in response a paper by Dave Webb about new developments in the militarisation of space presented to IAG.
2. The US has overwhelming predominance in sea based missiles ranged against China in the Pacific; China maintains no first use.
3. Report by ASPI, Australian Strategic Policy Institute - a military think-tank
4. See the US National Defence Strategy