Britain Palestine Project policy note on Israeli elections

Posted: 26th October 2026

Dear |MMERGE8|

Israelis vote tomorrow, 27 October, in their first general election since 7 October 2023. I enclose a short Britain Palestine Project policy note on what the result means for UK foreign policy and how the Government should respond prepared for BPP by one of the 2026 Just Peace Fellows, Tom Guha

Its central argument is simple. No likely outcome will, by itself, move Israel towards ending the occupation or agreeing a peace settlement. Progress will depend on sustained outside pressure, and the UK has a direct part to play. The contest is between Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud-led bloc and Gadi Eisenkot’s Yashar-led bloc. Polling has consistently suggested neither can form a government outright. The likeliest results are a fragile coalition after drawn-out negotiations, or collapse and a further election. Israel’s treatment of Palestinians has been almost absent from the campaign.

An Eisenkot government would probably change Israel’s tone. He has pledged to curb settler violence, has opposed the E1 plan, and may reverse some of the measures Israel took against the UK after the Foreign Secretary’s statement of 8 September, including the order to close the British consulate in East Jerusalem. But he has ruled out Palestinian self-governance, supports settlement expansion he considers “legal”, and defends continued occupation on security grounds. That is a return to the status quo that preceded 7 October, not a step towards ending the occupation.

The risk of escalation is high. On 23 October Israel launched a major operation across the West Bank and placed Hebron under siege. A Netanyahu minority or caretaker government would have clear political incentives to escalate further: to delay another election, to divide opponents during coalition talks, or to renew strikes on Iran, for which there are credible reports of US planning.

If no bloc wins a majority, outside pressure matters most during the coalition talks themselves. Parties need to know the price of their choices at the moment they make them. A fully implemented settlement trade ban, coordinated with allies, is the kind of concrete measure Israeli leaders would be forced to take a position on.

Whatever the result, we urge you to press the Government to:

1. Implement the settlement trade ban in full and within the 6–9 month timetable the Foreign Secretary announced, and rule out resuming talks on an upgraded UK–Israel trade agreement until there is meaningful progress towards ending the occupation.
2. Resist calls to give a new Israeli government time to settle in before acting, and not treat the reversal of Israel’s retaliatory measures against the UK as grounds for easing pressure.
3. Act on the UK’s obligations under the ICJ’s July 2024 Advisory Opinion, including the duty not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the unlawful occupation, in coordination with partners such as Canada and France.
4. Suspend arms exports wherever there is a risk UK-made weapons or components could be used to commit war crimes or enforce the occupation, and use the new IHL sanctions framework against ministers and senior commanders responsible for breaches.

As the Foreign Secretary told the House on 8 September, “I do not believe we can wait.” The election does not change that.
The full note is attached. My colleagues and I would be glad to brief you or your staff in more detail, before or after the result is known.
Yours sincerely,

Tom Guha
Britain Palestine Project Just Peace Fellow, 2026

How can the UK navigate Israel’s elections to push towards an end to the occupation and a peace settlement?
Tom Guha, Just Peace Fellow, 2026, Britain Palestine Project: HERE

 

BPP Briefing on the New Statutory Instrument which comes into force 15th October is HERE and is copied in below

BPP-Co_Op report The Miliband Package of Sanctions on Settlement: New sanctions powers and the urgent E1 test Parliamentary briefing, 14 October 2026 HERE

 
Policy Briefing
How can the UK navigate Israel’s elections to push towards an end to the occupation and a peace settlement?
Tom Guha, Just Peace Fellow, 2026, Britain Palestine Project

Israeli voters will head to the polls tomorrow. The outcome may not be known but the outlook for Palestinians hardly requires a crystal ball: displacement, violence and the denial of basic rights will continue. If Eisenkot takes over as Prime Minister, his government may take a more palatable tone in a bid to claw back some international legitimacy. He may take some action to reduce settler violence and could pause the E1 plan once again. While important, these are not serious steps towards ending the occupation or agreeing a peace settlement but rather an attempt at what Brian Brivati has described as a return to normalcy – to a failed status quo that ultimately led to October 7 and the genocide that followed. [1] The high risk of political collapse also magnifies the short-term risk of military escalation. Whatever the outcome, meaningful progress towards ending the occupation and securing a long-term peace settlement will require sustained outside pressure.  
The election is a battle between Netanyahu’s far-right Likud-led coalition and Eisenkot’s right-wing Yashar-led coalition. It’s been an election campaign dominated ultimately by one issue: security for Israelis. Conspicuously absent from public debate has been any meaningful engagement with Israel’s treatment of Palestinians. Since the last election, Israel has destroyed Gaza, displaced the entire population and killed at least 70,000 Palestinians in the enclave. The state now stands accused of genocide at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and its current Prime Minister is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Simultaneously, Israel has expanded settlements at breakneck speed and unleashed a campaign of state-backed settler violence to ethnically cleanse Palestinians in areas of the West Bank. It’s very presence in the West Bank and Gaza has now been found to be illegal by the ICJ. [2]
Polling has consistently indicated that neither Netanyahu’s or Eisenkot’s bloc will be able to form a government [3} In previous elections where no bloc has had a clear route to power, negotiations have either led to a precarious form of power sharing or political collapse resulting in further elections. With Israeli society extremely divided, power sharing between rival major parties looks unlikely. Through negotiations with smaller parties, either Eisenkot or Netanyahu may be able to cobble together a fragile majority. Political collapse is a distinct possibility.
As all of this plays out, how can the UK most effectively press Israel to end its unlawful occupation and make progress towards a peace settlement?

Resist shallow attempts to rehabilitate Israel’s international standing
On September 8, UK Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband recognised Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory as unlawful and that Palestinians in parts of the West Bank are being ethnically cleansed. He announced restrictions on settlement trade and a new sanctions framework to target those involved in violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Israel reacted furiously, ordering the closure of the British consulate in East Jerusalem, leading to a downgrading of the UK’s official presence in Palestine and British diplomats being withdrawn.[5]

Israel-UK relations have not been a significant electoral issue but if Eisenkot becomes Prime Minister, he has pledged to return Israel to the “the community of nations. [6] To mend relations with traditional allies like the UK, Eisenkot is likely to adjust his government’s tone and make some small tweaks in managing the occupation – but a significant shift towards ending it will not happen without sustained international pressure.
Eisenkot has committed to cracking down on settler violence in the occupied West Bank. He said he would evacuate settlements in Areas A and B and utilise administrative detention to remove violent settlers [7]. He has also publicly opposed the E1 plan, which has driven much of the international condemnation of Israel’s policies regarding the West Bank. [8] While a reduction in settler violence would bring much needed relief to Palestinians on the receiving end, Eisenkot’s proposals do not mark a significant shift in Israeli policy. Eisenkot has ruled out the possibility of Palestinian self-governance and emphasised the importance of continued Israeli occupation. [9]

Eisenkot is a supporter of settlement expansion but distinguishes from Netanyahu by arguing that settlements must be “legal”, likely to mean he is opposed to newly established settlement outposts in Area C and settlements in Areas A and B but disregards international law which considers all settlements as war crimes. [10] He has also argued that settlements “must  conform strictly to the map of Israel’s security interests,” a vague phrase that could be used to justify settlements in any context. [11] His position resembles a return to a status quo that for decades enabled Israel to gradually expropriate land and expand control without prompting significant backlash from the US or European states.

Eisenkot could make further concessions to states like the UK in pursuit of mending relations. He could undo some of the retaliatory measures Netanyahu’s government took against the UK following Miliband’s announcement banning settlement trade. These included ordering the closure of the UK’s consulate in East Jerusalem, the removal of British officials from the International Gaza Support Center (IGSC) and ending UK training for Palestinian police in the West Bank. [12] The UK must not reward a new Israeli government for simply undoing some of the punitive measures implemented by the previous one.

The UK must press ahead with its settlement trade ban regardless of any election outcome. Officials must ensure it is implemented as comprehensively as possible and within the 6–9-month timeframe announced by the Foreign Secretary. As the UK government now accepts the ICJ’s view that Israel’s occupation is unlawful, officials must examine the obligations placed on third states not to render aid or assistance to the maintenance of the unlawful situation and act accordingly. The UK must rule out the possibility of resuming negotiations to upgrade its trade agreement with Israel until meaningful progress towards ending the occupation and agreeing a peace settlement is realised.

Military escalation is likely – the UK must act fast and decisively 
On 23 October, just days before the election, Netanyahu launched a major military operation across the occupied West Bank. [13] Hebron was placed under siege and ministers in Netanyahu’s cabinet openly threatened war crimes. [14] The operation was launched in response to a gunfight in Hebron that left two Israeli soldiers and two Palestinians dead.
Israel’s escalation in the West Bank should be read as a warning. If Netanyahu ends up leading a minority government or acting as a short-term caretaker PM before another round of elections, he has multiple political incentives for a military escalation. Firstly, a renewed military offensive on any front could be used to justify postponing further elections and so buy him time to turn his political fortunes around. Secondly, he may gamble his political career on a renewed offensive on Iran in pursuit of the goal that has eluded him to date – regime change in Iran. And finally, as Dan Levy has argued, military escalation could be used as a tool to drive a wedge between parties during negotiations, limiting the options of opposition parties and creating a pathway whereby Netanyahu can cling to power. [15] There are already credible reports of US preparations for a renewed offensive on Iran. [16]
A regional escalation would be the first test of the new UK government’s approach to International Humanitarian Law (IHL). The previous UK government’s IHL assessments have been largely regarded as flawed as ministers were ultimately deferential to Israeli authorities on key questions such as military necessity, distinction and proportionality. [17] The process enabled arms exports to continue despite war crimes being blatantly committed. The new UK government must revise its approach and act swiftly and decisively to ban arms exports wherever there is risk that Israel may be using UK-manufactured arms or components to commit war crimes or enforce its unlawful occupation.

The UK should go further than expressions of support for international courts and support evidence submissions where it has evidence of possible war crimes. And the UK must make use of its recently published IHL sanctions framework to target ministers and senior military commanders for breaches of IHL.

Outside pressure can shape negotiations
A hung parliament is likely to lead to negotiations between parties. As Brian Brivati argues, outside pressure works inside these negotiations, not around them [18] Parties must know the price of actions at the point at which they debate them. Concrete action such as a settlement trade ban become doubly important in this context. If implemented fully and in coordination with international allies, financial and trade sanctions targeting settlement activity would create genuine economic pressure that Israeli political leaders would be forced to take a position on. Netanyahu and his bloc would likely retaliate harshly. But Eisenkot and his bloc, with a desire to rehabilitate Israel’s international standing and a political incentive to blame increased isolation on Netanyahu, could move to a position that brings them closer to that of the UK.

Such a move carries risk. There is already a siege mentality felt by many Israelis that such a move could contribute to, pushing people further to the right. But risk is inherent in foreign policy regarding conflict and risk aversion has contributed to inaction and enabled the failed status quo.

Do not allow for further delay
Pro-Israel MPs and advocacy groups called on Miliband to postpone his announcement banning settlement trade until after the elections. It is likely that the UK government will face similar pressure not to take significant action against any new Israeli government until it has had an opportunity to establish itself and change course of its own accord.

Given there is no indication that any electoral outcome will lead to Israel ending its occupation without significant outside pressure, the UK government must continue to press ahead with its settlement trade ban and explore further measures required to fulfil its obligations arising from the ICJ’s July 2024 Advisory Opinion. As Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband said in September, “I do not believe we can wait. I believe the situation is too urgent… It is our responsibility to decide what we accept, what we consider legal and what we do. [19]

Conclusion
There is no outcome of the Israeli election that improves the long-term prospects for a peace settlement by itself. There may be a change in tone and there could be some action to reduce settler violence and potentially the pausing of the E1 plan. There is also an increased short-term risk of a military escalation. To make meaningful progress towards ending the occupation and securing a long-term peace settlement, outside pressure – including from the UK – will remain vital.  
Different outcomes create different challenges and opportunities. The key to navigating those is in having a clear long-term strategy towards ending the occupation and ignoring tokenistic gestures that are aimed at returning to a failed status quo or stalling for time. In policy terms, that means the UK coordinating with middle-power allies like Canada and France, acting on its obligations contained in the ICJ’s 2024 Advisory Opinion and utilising its recently expanded sanctions framework to disincentivise further entrenchment of Israeli control in the occupied Palestinian territory and to pressure Israeli leaders to come to the negotiating table.