NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE BANNED! WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR BRITAIN?

Nuclear weapons continue to threaten the world with nuclear war and terror. In 2021, the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) entered into international force with the purpose of prohibiting the use, production, possession and deployment of all nuclear armaments and accelerating the total elimination of more than 13,000 weapons that are currently held in the arsenals of nine nuclear-armed States, including the UK.

As well as establishing obligations and responsibilities for States that join the Treaty, the TPNW’s prohibitions and provisions are set to provide a more effective disarmament toolbox for people all over the world, in the nuclear-armed and nuclear-free countries, to exert financial, political, normative and practical pressure for the removal and elimination of all nuclear weapons.

This timely report starts with an introductory overview of the strategic environment and challenges relating to nuclear weapons. Chapter 1 gives a commentary on the TPNW text, relevant negotiating history and implications. Following entry into force last year, the first Meeting of States Parties is scheduled for Vienna in March 2022 (Covid permitting). Chaired by Austria, this meeting will set the rules and framework for decision-making, and begin negotiations on establishing further capacities and institutions to oversee compliance, verification and enforcement of this Treaty in the future.

Chapter 2 analyses the evolution and changes in UK nuclear policies, problems, infrastructure, deployments and management. It provides an overview of debates on Dreadnought-Trident and recent developments that include accidents and miscalculations, as well as legal questions and the UK’s Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (IR2021), which was published in March 2021 by the Cabinet Office.

Chapter 3 considers the prospects for British nuclear disarmament, with analysis of several possible scenarios for change, including: pressures to transform security and economic priorities and provide greater cooperation and resources for tackling the climate emergency, Covid and other national and international security challenges; a shocking event such as a major nuclear accident or use; and the prospect of voters in Scotland deciding to become independent and nuclear free. Chapter 4 provides a short overview of the practical disarmament steps that the UK (or an independent Scotland) would need to take in order to sign and adhere to the TPNW.

The report also looks ahead to the tenth Review Conference of the 1968 Nuclear Non- proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was postponed again due to Covid, and is now scheduled for August 2022. The NPT entered into force in 1970 with the UK as a founding State Party, which entailed special responsibilities with particular regard to Article I on refraining from proliferation and Article VI, to pursue nuclear disarmament in good faith. The NPT’s credibility has been eroding these past three decades, mainly due to failures by major nuclear-armed states to fulfil their commitments on progressive steps to achieve nuclear disarmament and a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the Middle East, as adopted at previous review conferences in 1995, 2000 and 2010.

International relations between some if not all of the nuclear-armed governments and their leaders have been deteriorating, especially since 2005. As discussed in this report, increasing concerns among NPT States and civil society organisations led to humanitarian disarmament initiatives being launched at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The main

What does this mean for Britain

Nuclear weapons are banned

objectives were to raise awareness of the dangers and strengthen and fulfil the NPT’s core non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments. As a series of conferences and UN working groups discussed the humanitarian impacts, risks and dangers of nuclear weapons over the next few years, the majority of NPT states parties concluded that it was in their national security as well as global interests to prevent nuclear use and war by banning the activities that might enable a state or non-state actor to acquire, use, or upgrade and keep nuclear weapons. This was the context that led to multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations under UN auspices and the adoption of this new Treaty in 2017.

The elimination of around 50,000 nuclear weapons since 1987 has practically stopped, as new and upgraded warheads and missiles are being developed, including in the United Kingdom. The nuclear policies announced in the 2021 Integrated Review increase the risks of nuclear use and proliferation by widening the circumstances in which nuclear weapons might be fired and raising the ceiling on the UK’s nuclear arsenal by 40%, as well as other steps that undermine the UK’s previous commitments to transparency, nuclear disarmament and verification. The United Nations immediately raised concerns that such steps were contrary to the UK’s obligations under Article VI of the NPT, and would have a damaging impact on global stability. In May, a Joint Opinion from legal scholars Professor Christine Chinkin and Dr Louise Arimatsu concluded that IR 2021 breached the NPT. During a House of Lords debate in May 2021, many peers, including the Archbishop of Canterbury sounded the alarm that such policies increased nuclear dangers, including the risks of disastrous miscalculation.

The report, which is primarily aimed at elected representatives and the public, contains analyses and references that will be important for defence practitioners, officials, investors, journalists and all who influence decisions that affect our human, national and international security.

Recommendations, which are outlined in more detail in the report’s conclusions, include:

• The UK must take urgent steps to comply with existing NPT disarmament and non- proliferation commitments.

• In light of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and taking into account the security and financial costs of retaining nuclear weapons, the Westminster and Scottish Parliaments should undertake separate parliamentary investigations to determine what would be entailed in pursuing nuclear disarmament and joining the TPNW.

• The UK and Scottish governments, mayors and members of parliaments and regional assemblies should do their best to participate in the first and future meetings of TPNW States Parties, which they can do as observers.

• Civil society and elected representatives can exert real and lasting influence on the UK’s nuclear options and policies by using the TPNW’s prohibitions and provisions to promote nuclear-free cities and counties and to persuade local authorities, banks and private investors to move money away from nuclear weapons and towards sustainable security needs for protecting our climate, environment and sustainable security approaches.

• The Scottish Government should consider reconvening its Working Group on Scotland without nuclear weapons.