Nuclear restraint, no-first-use and the Russia/Ukraine war

Posted: 28th February 2023

February 24 marked one year since Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine. The invasion was combined with coercive threats by Russia of possible use of nuclear weapons, which President Putin has repeated (in slightly different formulations) during the past year.

Current indications are that both the war, and the continuing threats of nuclear weapons use, will continue for some time. Russia is reported to be mobilizing nearly 300,000 – 500,000 additional troops with which to launch massive attacks in Ukraine as spring arrives. And on February 21, President Putin announced the suspension of Russia’s participation in the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and his decision to put strategic weapons on combat readiness.

However, there are some recent developments and analyses that give a small ray of hope. These include the Chinese peace proposal and indications in recent articles by Timothy Snyder, Morton Halperin and Arms Control Today that nuclear restraint and the nuclear taboo are holding despite the nuclear threats. This taboo was strengthened by the G20 countries in the Bali Leaders Declaration in November, in which they affirmed that “The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible.”

Also, in this update, we report on the nuclear war prevention/no-first-use proposal to the Global Futures Forum and the UN Summit of the Future.
 

Chinese peace proposal for the Russia/Ukraine conflict

On February 24, the government of China released a 12-point peace proposal to end the Russia/Ukraine war.

The proposal sets forth principles and objectives to resolve the conflict without specifying what might be the negotiated political solutions. These principals and objectives include: Respecting the sovereignty of all countries, Abandoning the Cold War mentality, Ceasing hostilities, Resuming peace talks, Resolving the humanitarian crisis, Protecting civilians and prisoners of war, Keeping nuclear power plants safe, Reducing strategic risks, Facilitating grain exports, Stopping unilateral sanctions, Keeping industrial and supply chains stable and Promoting post-conflict reconstruction.

The proposal provides short explanations of each of the above. Under Reducing strategic risks,for example, the proposal says that “Nuclear weapons must not be used and nuclear wars must not be fought. The threat or use of nuclear weapons should be opposed.” .

Both Ukraine and Russia have shown interest in the proposal. The Russian Foreign Ministry announced that they ‘share China’s views’. Ukraine has cautiously welcomed the proposal, despite some reservations and questions about what it means in practice, and concerns about China’s related actions. These include reports that China is considering supplying weapons to Russia. President Zelensky has indicated that ‘China’s interest to broker peace is not bad’ and has requested a summit meeting with Chinese Premier Li Jinping to discuss further.
 

The Nuclear Taboo (when decision-making is rational)
Timothy Snyder

On February 8, 2023, Timothy Snyder published a blog article Nuclear War! Why it isn’t happeningwhich discusses the nuclear threats being made by President Putin during the war against Ukraine, why they have not led to actual nuclear weapons use, and why they are unlikely to lead to such use even if Russia is faced with militarily losing the war.

The key point that Snyder makes is that President Putin and other Russian political leaders know that any use of nuclear weapons by Russia would be ineffectual in helping them win the war and would only be counter-productive militarily, legally and politically to Russia. Snyder argues that any actual use of nuclear weapons would eliminate the coercive power of the threat to use nuclear weapons, and that this is only one of the costs to Russia of any such use.

“The use of a nuclear weapon on the Ukrainian battlefield would have far greater costs than this for Russia: in the moment, and for years and decades down the line. Moscow would lose even what tentative support it has around the world. It would forfeit its ability to present itself as a victim in international relations. Its leaders would know that they would be remembered as criminals and pariahs. And that is not even to mention what would usually be mentioned first: direct deterrence. Should Russia break the taboo of nuclear use, its own status as a military power would be dramatically compromised by the military response of others.”
Snyder provides rational reasons for why the taboo against the use of nuclear weapons is holding despite Russian nuclear threats in the war against Ukraine.

However, Snyder’s argument does not take into account irrational decision-making which can occur during a crisis, nor the risks of nuclear weapons use through miscalculation or accident during a conflict. Additional, concrete nuclear weapons policy and operational measures – such as adoption and implementation of no-first-use policies – are required to ensure the nuclear taboo is not broken. 
 

Threats to use nuclear weapons first (or even second) are not viable
Morton Halperin

In an article The lesson of Ukraine: Threats to use nuclear weapons first (or even second) are not viable, published on 19 December 2022, Dr Morten Halperin, argues that Russia’s threats to use nuclear weapons in the Russia/Ukraine war created an imminent possibility of nuclear war, and that this challenged military and political leaders on both sides to examine this possibility and its potential outcomes.

Dr Halperin – who was a nuclear policy advisor in the Clinton, Nixon, Johnson and Kennedy administrations – says that this sobering analysis made them realise that nuclear weapons are not effective instruments of foreign policy, that any outcome from the use of nuclear weapons would be catastrophic for everyone concerned including those who used them, that responding to the use of nuclear weapons with a nuclear retaliation would also be counter-productive, and that therefore neither the first use nor retaliatory use should be contemplated.

However, Dr Halperin argues that this realization is not sufficient to prevent the possibility of nuclear weapons use. Rather, it should be turned into specific declarations on non-use of nuclear weapons in the Ukraine conflict, more general no-first-use and non-use of nuclear weapons declarations covering all situations, followed by negotiations by the nuclear armed and allied states of a Treaty Prohibiting the Use of Nuclear Weapons. This would be complementary to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and also to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weaponswhich has been adopted by non-nuclear states. 

The Nuclear Taboo and how to strengthen it
Arms Control Today

On February 22, Arms Control Today published a brief Strengthening the Nuclear Taboo in the Midst of Russia’s War on Ukraine which discusses the nuclear threats made by President Putin. The brief highlights the illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as affirmed by the International Court of Justice in 1996, notes that so far the 78-year long taboo against nuclear weapons use has held, but urges further pressure be made by civil society and the international community against those who might try to break the nuclear taboo.

The briefing recommends the following actions:

• Governments and civil society reiterate condemnations of any threatened nuclear weapons use,
• U.S. and Russia re-establish a regular, high-level risk reduction dialogue;
• U.S. and European military continue to calibrate their support for Ukraine in ways to avoid escalation:
• U.S. continue to refrain from making threats of nuclear retaliation;
• The international community prepare a strong global diplomatic response to further threats of nuclear weapons use, including through a Uniting for Peace resolution in the UN General Assembly. 

 

Nuclear war prevention, no-first-use proposal
Global Futures Forum and UN Summit of the Future

In order to better prevent war, promote peace and protect the planet for current and future generations, the UN General Assembly has decided to hold a Summit of the Future: Multilateral Solutions for a Better Tomorrow in September 2024, preceded by a preparatory ministerial meeting in September 2023.

The Summit will adopt a Declaration/Pact for the Future and establish a UN Special Envoy for Future Generations. In addition, the UN Secretary-General is preparing a New Agenda for Peacein conjunction with preparations for the Summit.
 
The global Coalition for the UN We Need (C4UN), is facilitating civil society input into the UN Summit and its preparatory process. This includes a Global Futures Forum on March 20-21, and a number of regional consultations.

A group of non-governmental organizations (members of NoFirstUse Global) have submitted a proposal that the New Agenda for Peace and the Summit of the Future:

• Affirm the inadmissibility of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, and call on all nuclear armed states to operationalize this by adopting no-first-use policies, taking all nuclear forces off alert and ending the stationing or deployment of nuclear forces in foreign territories:
   
• Highlight the obligations under the UN Charter to refrain from the threat or use of force in international relations and to resolve international disputes through peaceful means including by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice;
   
• Call on all UN member states to accede to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice for disputes which are unable to be resolved through other peaceful means, and set a goal of 2035 to achieve universal acceptance of such compulsory jurisdiction;
   
• Reaffirm the mandate of the UN General Assembly to act in order to prevent or respond to acts of aggression when the Security Council fails to do so.

To get involved, register for the Global Futures Forum.

NoFirstUse Global is a network of organizations, academics, policy makers and civil society advocates working cooperatively for the adoption of no-first-use policies by nuclear-armed States, the support for such policies from nuclear allied countries, and the implementation of such policies to help achieve broader nuclear risk-reduction, non-proliferation and disarmament measures.