Ban Treaty advances the G20 affirmation on inadmissibility of nuclear weapons threat or use
Posted: 20th December 2023
States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), meeting in New York from 27 November to 1 December 2023, adopted a declaration Our commitment to upholding the prohibition of nuclear weapons and averting their catastrophic consequences in which they applauded “the growing explicit recognition that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible” and noted that “these declarations, such as that agreed by members of the G-20, must go beyond statements and result in meaningful and tangible actions.”
The TPNW States Parties were referring to paragraph 4 of the Bali Declaration, adopted by the G20 leaders at their November 2022 Summit. (See Breakthrough at the G20 Summit: Leaders of nuclear weapon and allied states affirm the inadmissibility of nuclear weapons threat or use).
Since the Bali Summit, NoFirstUse Global has been trying to get universal affirmation and implementation of this stance, without much success from governments until now. This is a most promising and necessary development in a time of increased tensions, conflicts and nuclear sabre-rattling.
G20 Bali declaration on inadmissibility strengthens the customary norm against nuclear weapons threat or use
“The importance of the G20 Bali statement is that it strengthens a customary norm against the threat or use of nuclear weapons which is applicable universally, regardless of whether or not a State is party to the TPNW, NPT or other nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament treaty. But the G20 statement needs to be consolidated and implemented. This is why NoFirstUse Global launched Nuclear Taboo from Norm to Law following the G20 Summit, and why we highly commend the States Parties to the TPNW for following up on this.”
Alyn Ware, International Representative for Aotearoa Lawyers for Peace. Member of the NoFirstUse Global Steering Committee
TPNW, UN General Assembly and the G20 Summit
The Second Meeting of States Party (2MSP) to the TPNW was held on the heels of the 78th Session of the First Committee (1stComm) of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). With the above cited paragraph, the 2MSP corrected a glaring omission in the 1stComm (lack of reference to the Bali Declaration); and thereby renewed hope for progress toward a nuclear weapons free world (NWFW).Despite a lack of reference in the UNGA to the Bali Declaration, the UNGA did adopt a UNGA resolution calling for a Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons which was supported by two nuclear armed states (China and India) and a majority of non-nuclear states.
However, not all of the States Parties to the TPNW supported the UNGA resolution, believing that it might detract from the TPNW, even though none of the nuclear armed or allied states support the TPNW. This contrasts with the views of most States Parties to the TPNW that these two approaches (TPNW and the Convention Prohibiting Use) are complementary. See, for example, the Explanation of Vote of Thailand.
Complementarity of the TPNW and a Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons
“Were there even a single nuclear-armed state actively engaging with the TPNW, creating a less demanding alternative might have a negative effect. Unfortunately, there is none at this juncture and anything that draws the nuclear armed states toward a NWFW should be treated as positive.”
Aaron Tovish, Member of the NoFirstUse Global Steering Committee. Commenting on the complementarity of the TPNW and a Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons
“Were there even a single nuclear-armed state actively engaging with the TPNW, creating a less demanding alternative might have a negative effect. Unfortunately, there is none at this juncture and anything that draws the nuclear armed states toward a NWFW should be treated as positive.”
Aaron Tovish, Member of the NoFirstUse Global Steering Committee. Commenting on the complementarity of the TPNW and a Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons
NPT Review Conference – 2nd Preparatory Committee
The next forum for advancing inadmissibility could be the 2nd Preparatory Committee (PrepComm) for the 11th Review Conference (RevCon) of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
No-first-use policy was broached at the 1st PrepComm in August this year (see NPT States parties call for No-First-Use policies), but went down with the rest of the chairman’s draft report, when Russia rejected it for other reasons.
If the war on Ukraine remains unresolved this coming May, the same could happen again. But simply having countries openly championing inadmissibility (while none openly oppose it) would be a significant step forward in comparison to the deafening silence in the recent 1stComm!
