KICK NUCLEAR - September 2024

THE HORRIBLE HISTORY OF EPRS

The original European Pressurised Reactor (EPR) was designed in 1994 by a group from Electricité de France (EDF) with another French company, Areva, and a German company Siemens. However only EDF has managed to sell reactors of this design following further design development.

But, in spite of EDF’s ambitious plans, so far only four EPR reactors have so far been built in the 30 years since 1994, and only three of these have reached commercial operation.

The first one to begin construction was at Olkiluoto in Finland, in 2005. The reactor was originally supposed to start commercial operation in May 2009 but this was only only achieved on May 1 2023, 14 years later, mainly due to endless technical problems. This also meant a great hike in the cost of the project. Areva, the builders, were contracted to be paid 3bn euros for building the reactor, but the final cost of building the plant proved to be about 11bn euros. Presumably the extra cost fell on Areva.

The second to begin construction was at Flamanville 3 in France. This began construction in December 2007, with a planned date to begin operating of 2012. But it didn’t begin producing electricity commercially until September 4 2024, so the delay in this case was a little less than for the Finnish reactor! However the following day the plant shut down automatically. According to an EDF spokesperson this “showed the safety system was working well”, while the reasons for the shutdown were being investigated. Again the delays in opening have increased the estimated cost of the project, from the original estimate of 3.3bn euros to 13.2bn euros.

Two EPRs have been constructed in China, at Taishan. Taishan 1 began building November 2009 and Taishan 2 in April 2010. Taishan entered commercial service in December 2018, but was shut down from July 2021 to August 2022 because of faulty fuel-rods. Taishan 2 entered service in September 2019. The original completion dates had been 2013. so there had been 6-7 years delay. At some stage the estimated cost was $7.5bn. I imagine this was the original estimated cost. I can’t find a figure for the final cost but presumably it had also gone up considerably due to the long delays in completion.

The EPRs in construction are at the 2-reactor Hinkley Point C power station in Somerset. This began construction in March 2017, with an expected completion date of 2025. In January 2024 EDF announced reactor 1 at the site is not now expected to be completed until 2029-31 meaning it is to take at least as long to build as the Finnish and French EPRs. EDF said at the same time it couldn’t give an expected completion date for reactor 2.

Again the estimated cost of the project has soared. When the project was agreed in 2016 the estimate was £18bn. It is now estimated it will cost between £31 billion and £34 billion.

Nor is it clear who is to cover this immense sum. Currently the project is currently owned 66.5% by EDF and 33.5% Chinese state company CGN. EDF and most probably CGN have been aiming to sell off all or part of their stakes in the project, but so far without success.

CGN only invested in the Hinkley C and Sizewell C projects on the understanding that the British government would allow it to built its own design of nuclear power plant at Bradwell in Essex. The UK government reneged on this agreement on security grounds and indeed also bought out CGN’s 20% stake in the Sizewell C project. Thus the reason for which CGN invested in Hinkley Point C and Sizewell C was negated. I imagine CGN would want the British government to buy out its stake in Hinkley C as it has in Sizewell C but the UK government has as yet not done so. Certainly there is no chance of CGN increasing its stake in Hinkley C.

The French government has also stated that it does not intend to invest in Hinkley C but urges the UK government to do so, holding the latter responsible for CGN stopping funding for Hinkley after the UK government reneged on its agreement with CGN.

This leaves the very expensive buck stopping with the UK government if it wants the projects to go through. And, in spite of the horrible history of EPRs, this the British government seems quite prepared to do. Thus at the end of August the new British Labour government announced they would invest a further £5.5 billion in Sizewell C, adding to the £2.5 billion the previous Conservative government had invested. And this is still nowhere near meeting the full cost of building Sizewell C, for which estimates as said earlier range from £20bn to £38.5bn. That leaves a black hole of at least £12bn to fill. The Conservative government or invested £2.5bn in the project with the idea it would encourage other investors. This has so far failed and there’s little sign that pouring in another £4.5bn will succeed any better. If it also fails will the government continue to pour in yet more money or decide at some stage to let the project fail? The final investment decision for the project hasn’t been made and cannot be made until this black hole is filled; if it isn’t the decision must be to end the project.

As Together Against Sizewell C wrote in a press release on August 30: “It’s staggering that Labour have increased the potential outlay on this white elephant project to £8 billion just days after Labour claimed the country couldn’t afford winter fuel payments for millions of pensioners who will struggle to keep their homes warm, and after refusing to scrap the two-child benefit limit. Funds wasted on Sizewell C would be better spent on measures such as insulation and energy efficiency that could reduce bills now, as well as [it being] quicker to deploy renewables that will produce cheaper, cleaner electricity without the legacy of toxic radioactive waste.”                       David Polden

NEW BOOK

“Nuclear is Not the Solution; The Folly of Atomic Power in the Age of Climate Change” by MV Ramana. Professor of Physics at the University of British Columbia has been published July 30. 272pp. Hardback £16 from Verso Books.

Blurb: “THE CLIMATE CRISIS has propelled nuclear energy back into fashion. Its proponents argue we already have the technology of the future and that it only needs perfection and deployment. Nuclear Is Not the Solution demonstrates why this sort of thinking is not only naïve but dangerous.

Even beyond the horrific implications of meltdown and the intractable problem of waste disposal, nuclear is not practicable on such a large scale. Any appraisal of future energy technology depends on two important parameters: cost and time. Nuclear fails on both counts. It is more costly than its renewable competitors wind and solar. And, importantly given the need for rapid transformation, it is slow. A plant takes a decade to come online. If you include permits and fundraising, this adds another decade. And we should not forget the deep roots it has in the defense industry.

M. V. Ramana’s powerful book destroys any illusion that nuclear is our answer to climate change, untangling technical arguments into simple and sensible language. Importantly, Nuclear Is Not the Solution also unmasks the powerful groups with vested interests in the maintenance of the status quo, currently working hard to greenwash a spectacularly dirty industry.”