Trump’s new Board of Peace plan challenges UN peace roles well beyond Gaza
Posted: 22nd January 2026
A central issue with Trump’s latest Board of Peace plans is legal basis. The BoP claims legitimacy largely through United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2803, which authorises the Board only in relation to Gaza and only for a limited time (until 2027) as part of a transitional arrangement connected to a ceasefire.
By contrast, the BoP Charter’s language and Trump’s correspondence indicate an aspiration to expand the Board’s remit to other conflicts and potentially indefinitely. There is no clear foundation in international law for a “global mandate” beyond Gaza unless further UNSC resolutions or new international agreements expressly grant such authority. Acting without that would run against the UN Charter framework, which does not generally recognise independent bodies imposing peace settlements outside UN authorisation or the consent of the relevant states.
Linked to this is the principle of state sovereignty and consent. Under the Vienna Convention principle that treaties create no obligations for non-consenting states, the Board cannot lawfully impose its services on states or territories that have not agreed to them. In practice, a worldwide BoP role would require either invitations from the states concerned or a specific UN mandate for each case. Without those, the “global mandate” is framed as aspirational at best—and potentially unlawful if it attempted to override consent or UN authority.
The BoP has a legitimacy and oversight gap. While Resolution 2803 recognises the BoP in Gaza as a transitional administration with international legal personality, the arrangement is described as lacking a robust UN supervision mechanism. Some UNSC members reportedly criticised the resolution as vague regarding the Board’s structure and terms, and urged transparency and inclusivity. The BoP Charter’s rhetoric, which calls for moving beyond institutions that “have too often failed,” is read as an implicit critique of the UN and an attempt to position the BoP as a parallel, “more nimble” alternative—yet without the UN’s near-universal membership and accountability architecture.
Another major concern is the BoP’s internal governance model. The draft structure concentrates power in one individual through a lifetime chairmanship for President Trump and personal invitation-based membership. Extended membership is tied to exceptionally large financial contributions (reported as $1bn in the first year), a “pay-to-play” feature is highly unusual in treaty practice and risks skewing decision-making toward wealthy sponsors, undermining sovereign equality.
Finally, Gaza is the critical test case. Gaza is occupied territory in international-law terms, meaning Israel, as occupying power, retains core obligations under occupation law (including responsibilities to the civilian population) that cannot simply be displaced by inserting a new administrative actor.
The Board’s actions would need to respect the conservationist limits of occupation law, protect civilians’ rights, and—most importantly—advance Palestinian self-determination. An interim administration lacking Palestinian consent and making statehood conditional risks entrenching external control. There must be greater local participation, transparency, and credible accountability mechanisms (for example, complaints channels or oversight arrangements) so the Board’s governance does not become an unreviewable authority.
Whether the BoP gains credibility or is condemned as a neo-colonial trusteeship will depend on whether it delivers reconstruction and a genuine transition to legitimate Palestinian governance consistent with international law.
Best wishes,
Dr Brian Brivati
Executive Director, Britain Palestine Project
